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Fisher's departure the leaders of the great parties in the State were sitting in council to form a Coalition Government". That Lord Fisher was in no manner responsible for the Dardanelles disaster is clearly brought out: "When Lord Fisher first supported the idea of perfecting the unity of the allied line by opening the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, he contemplated making the attempt with a strong combined force which was to strike suddenly and quickly. . . . It was only with reluctance that he had assented to the Dardanelles enterprise as it was actually undertaken, and so soon as it became clear that the political situation in the Balkans and the available military force gave no prospect of success by a *coup de main* he became frankly opposed to it." When his colleagues refused him the necessary forces to strike a quick blow he resigned.

In spite, however, of the manner in which Sir Julian has overcome the difficulty of writing history so soon after the events, the idea will not down that it would have been wiser to postpone the publication of the official history for a certain period, an idea to which the author himself gives color in his remarks upon certain authorities: "The publication of these works since the history began to be written has proved of great assistance in correcting false impressions and supplying gaps in our own information." It would be a hardy prophet indeed who should declare that no further important documents would come to light, and that no more useful, even vital and indispensable, books would appear. Any claim of finality must, therefore, be denied to any history written before all the actors in the drama have spoken and all the records have been filed. The present really marvellous work of Corbett, Fayle, and Hurd must, however, be admired and welcomed, for it may be doubted whether, at a future time, any authors could command that enthusiasm of style that raises even the description of commonplace occurrences out of the commonplace, and makes them throb with interest, that enthusiasm that flows from men still under the influence of the stupendous events they are narrating.

EDWARD BRECK.

Battlefields of the World War, Western and Southern Fronts: a Study in Military Geography. By DOUGLAS WILSON JOHNSON, Professor of Physiography in Columbia University. [American Geographical Society Research Series, no. 3.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1921. Pp. xxvi, 648, and plates. \$7.90.)

ALL military operations culminate on the battlefield; the final test of a manœuvre is the battle which terminates it, its striking features are the skirmishes incidental to it. The soldier must study these engagements, for his is the responsibility of handling troops in battle. The civilian thinks largely in terms of battles, for the actual conflict is the visible evidence of the manœuvre behind it.

But behind it is the manœuvre, the strategy, of which the tactics are

the servant. This also the soldier studies, after he has gained a little knowledge of the technique and tactics of handling men in action. The civilian who goes into this is the one whose training leads him to ask "why?" when he reads the story of the battle. It is strong meat, dangerous to the immature or weak mental digestion.

Behind this again is military geography, determining the strategy from the point of view of execution, as national policy determines its aims. But what is behind military geography? Behind all geography, evidently, is geology, and hence there must be a military geology.

Returning now to our starting point, tactics, we find the same geographic influence there. Behind this still is geology, affecting every detail of a soldier's life, from the siting of his fortifications to the location and depth of his latrines.

This fundamental and little considered science is the subject of this book.

The writer, professor of physiography in Columbia University, has long been interested in the military aspects of his science. Shortly after the United States entered the war, he published his first book on the subject, *Topography and Strategy in the War*, interpreting the previous operations in terms of land-forms, and preparing his readers to grasp the topographic reasons for those to come, and their significance. This book is the logical successor of the earlier one. It is not a history; it is rather a treatise on geology, avoiding technicalities, but tracing the geology down through geography, and deducing the military conclusions; then testing and elaborating these conclusions by a short narrative of the operations of the recent war, with frequent excursions into those of Napoleon and even Attila and the Romans.

For this undertaking the writer is well qualified. He was commissioned major in the National Army in January, 1918, assigned to military intelligence duty, and sent to France in February. On this duty he continued until March, 1919, visiting all parts of the theatre of operations, and after the armistice joining General Bliss in Paris.

For the purposes of the book, it was necessary to make a territorial, rather than a logical or chronological, classification of the operations. At the same time it was necessary to avoid treating them in territorial water-tight compartments, losing their connection and hence their significance. The difficulties are obvious, but the results, while they would be unsatisfactory in a history, are highly satisfactory here. Each "battle-field", or natural theatre of operations, is described, and then the campaigns in that region explained briefly, but with judgment. Enough of the general military situation is given in each case, not to satisfy one looking for a narrative history, but to refresh the memory of one having a little general knowledge of the course of the war.

American operations are described in their proper places, with no greater emphasis than is given to the others. Their character and im-

portance stand out clearly enough without that. This same uniformity of treatment is noticeable throughout. Perhaps not the least of the merits of the book is that it gives a picture on a uniform scale—as it must of necessity do if the illustrations are to be of any use for their technical purpose—bringing the less known operations, as those in Italy and the Balkans, into relation with the more familiar Argonne and the over-emphasized “Flanders fields”.

OLIVER L. SPAULDING, JR.

Allied Shipping Control: an Experiment in International Administration. By J. A. SALTER, C.B., Commandeur de la Légion d'Honneur. [Economic and Social History of the World War, British Series, JAMES T. SHOTWELL, Ph.D., General Editor. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History.] (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1921. Pp. xxiii, 372. 10s. 6d.)

It is well to note that Mr. Salter's purpose in his interesting and well-written book on *Allied Shipping Control* was not to give a detailed description of the national methods and organizations for shipping control which prevailed in each of the allied countries during the war, but to describe the system of control prevailing in Great Britain in a preliminary way, and then to present full information concerning inter-allied shipping control. The author expressly states that “the main object of this work is to describe the work of the Allied Maritime Transport Council (the A. M. T. C.) and its permanent organization, the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, as an experiment in international administration”.

Part I. contains a brief account of the importance of shipping during the war, of the problems that arose, and of the plans adopted for their solution. Parts II. and IV. contain a rather full account of British shipping control. The methods described include the power of requisition, the prohibition and restriction of imports, the control of vessel chartering, the control of the employment of un requisitioned vessels by license, the acquisition and distribution of the main articles of food and raw materials of the country, the allocation of shipping, and selection between imports, the blockade, the policy of Great Britain with respect to neutral shipping, and the methods adopted to combat the submarine menace.

Part IV. comprises the principal historical record of the book, for it is here that the allied or international control of shipping during the war is discussed. The author not only draws upon the valuable official documents and statistical information reproduced in the appendix (part VI.), but shows the first-hand knowledge of war events acquired from his positions as Director of Ship Requisition, Secretary to the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and Chairman of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive. After tracing briefly the unorganized efforts of Great Britain to assist her allies in the matter of tonnage during the early years of the